‘Just Ridiculous’: Philosopher Thomas Nagel Takes On AI Consciousness

‘Just Ridiculous’: Philosopher Thomas Nagel Takes On AI Consciousness


Thomas Nagel has done landmark work on consciousness in nonhumans. This week, he won the million-dollar Berggruen Prize for his contributions to the field—and he has a lot of thoughts on AI.


By Steven Levy | November 18, 2026


!American philosopher Thomas Nagel.




A Lifetime of Asking What It Means to Be Conscious


Few philosophers have shaped contemporary thinking about consciousness as profoundly as Thomas Nagel. Best known for his landmark 1974 essay “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?”, Nagel argued that subjective experience—the felt quality of being something—cannot be fully captured by objective, third-person descriptions of physical processes. That insight remains a foundational challenge to materialist accounts of mind, and it has only grown more consequential as artificial intelligence systems become more capable and more conversationally convincing.


This week, Nagel was awarded the million-dollar Berggruen Prize for Philosophy & Culture, recognizing his decades of contributions to the field—particularly his work on consciousness in nonhuman animals and the limits of scientific explanation.


Nagel on AI: ‘Just Ridiculous’


In a wide-ranging conversation following the award, Nagel was characteristically direct about the current wave of claims surrounding AI consciousness. While he acknowledged the sophistication of modern large language models and their ability to mimic human conversation, he was blunt in his assessment of assertions that such systems might be conscious—calling the idea “just ridiculous.”


For Nagel, the gap between generating fluent text and having genuine subjective experience is not a matter of degree but of kind. A system that processes and produces language, however impressively, does not thereby possess an inner life—there is no “something it is like” to be that system. This distinction, central to his philosophy since the 1970s, has become newly urgent in 2026 as AI developers, ethicists, and the public grapple with questions of machine sentience, moral status, and the risks of anthropomorphizing increasingly humanlike interfaces.


Why the Question Matters More Than Ever


Nagel’s skepticism arrives at a pivotal moment. In 2026, debates over AI welfare have moved from academic seminars into boardrooms and legislatures, with some researchers proposing frameworks for detecting machine consciousness and others warning against premature moral panic. Nagel’s position serves as a philosophical anchor: the burden of proof lies with those who claim consciousness, not with those who doubt it. Subjective experience, he maintains, cannot be inferred from behavioral sophistication alone.


A Career of Reshaping the Debate


Nagel’s influence extends far beyond the bat essay. His books—including The View From Nowhere and Mind and Cosmos—have consistently pressed on the tension between scientific objectivity and subjective reality. The Berggruen Prize, awarded annually to a thinker whose ideas have shaped human self-understanding, adds institutional weight to a body of work that has already reshaped how philosophers, cognitive scientists, and now AI researchers frame their questions.


For Nagel, the rise of AI has not changed the fundamental problem of consciousness—it has simply given it a new and highly visible stage.

via Wired AI

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